Introduction
With the publication in 1986 of his study of Irish development entitled Ireland in Crisis: A Study of Capitalist Colonial Undevelopment, Raymond Crotty was recognised as a one of Ireland's leading development thinkers, making a highly original contribution to our understanding of the country's long-term development trajectory. However, his death in 1994 deprived him of the opportunity of responding to a set of circumstances that seemed to call into question many of the central tenets of his theory of Irish 'undevelopment', as he called it. For, over the period 1994-2000 the Republic of Ireland 1 achieved the highest economic growth rates in its history and came to be widely referred to as 'the Celtic Tiger'. The term, derived from the success of the East Asian Tigers, implied that the intense economic and social change of the period merited being seen as a case of significant developmental success. The claim was explicitly made, for example, by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) which asserted that this was a period of exceptional economic and social development for Ireland (NESC, 2002) . High growth rates, declining unemployment, the reversal of Ireland's long-term pattern of emigration, the developmental role attributed to the Irish state, and the decline in the state's indebtedness all seemed to invalidate central features of Crotty's work.
The purpose of this paper is to place Crotty's work within the wider literature on Ireland's development, paying special attention to whether his central insights continue to have any validity in the light of the Celtic Tiger period. Following this introduction, the paper firstly examines the validity of applying development theory to the Irish case through outlining Ireland's development trajectory. It then goes on in the subsequent section to survey the principal interpretative frameworks used in the social science literature to understand Ireland's development, particularly its development over the period of the Celtic Tiger. Though it predates this period, Raymond Crotty's contribution to the literature is outlined at some length. The next section draws on key insights from development theory to examine the nature and sustainability of the economic and social changes associated with the Celtic Tiger, highlighting the continuing validity of some of Crotty's central insights to interpret core ambiguities of Ireland's development model. The final section draws conclusions both about the Celtic Tiger and about the continuing relevance of development theory.
Ireland as a Developing Country
Ireland has featured little in development literature, being largely seen as a developed western European state far removed from the challenges facing countries throughout the so-called 'developing world'. Yet, its geographical situation has served to distract attention from the nature of its development trajectory. Western Europe's only colony, it is unique in the region in having experienced the systematic and widespread plantation by settlers from Scotland and England of sizeable protions of its land, in having its native political, educational and social institutions destroyed, and in having imposed on it structures that served the needs of its largely foreign (in origin, religion and culture) ruling class. For Raymond Crotty, who has been described as 'one of Ireland's most distinguished social science scholars' (Mjøset, quoted in Coughlan, 1998: 140) , the imposition of individual private property in land and of a state that ensured that land and capital remained cheap for the elites that had access to them, constituted the cause of what he called 'undevelopment' and for this reason he sees Ireland as belonging to the group of countries that suffered this fate :
'Ireland and the countries of the Third World share the common, unique experience of having been capitalist colonized. All of them, within the past 500 years, have been conquered and had sovereignty exercised over their indigenous populations by one or another of nine European countries. … Ireland and the countries of the Third World, which have experienced this process, undergo socioeconomic retrogression. They do not develop less rapidly, or 'under develop' ; they retrogress or undevelop' (Crotty, 2001: 5) .
Furthermore, Ireland's integration into the booming industrial economy of Britain in the nineteenth century resulted in a classic 'Third World' economic structure as the raising of cattle mostly for export became Ireland's main economic activity, particularly following the Great Famine of 1845-48. Meanwhile, incipient forms of industrialisation could not survive the competition from the products of the British industrial revolution which flooded into Ireland following the Act of Union in 1801. Only in the north-east of the island did an industrial economy emerge as a growth pole of the British economy but the partition of the island at independence in 1922 meant that the new southern Irish state was 'virtually without industries ' (Ó Gráda, 1994: 313) . In 1929, 86 per cent of its exports were agricultural and the export of live animals, mostly cattle, to Britain made up 42 per cent of all the state's exports. Only in 1932 was a determined attempt begun to lay the foundations of an industrial economy through active state involvement behind high tariff barriers. This policy has been likened by a senior Irish industrial economist to that of Import Substitution Industrialisation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico (O'Malley, 1992: 32) and, following initial successes, it ran up in the 1950s against similar problems such as the limitations imposed by the size of the home market and persistent balance of payments difficulties. In response to these, and prompted by the liberalisation of western European economies in the 1950s, the Irish government adopted an export-oriented industrial strategy in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Ireland therefore should most accurately be categorised as a Newly Industrialising Country (NIC) similar to those of East Asia and Latin America. This has been recognised by many Irish analysts (O'Hearn, 1989; Girvin, 1989; Jacobson, 1989; Jacobsen, 1994; Curtin et al., 1996 , Kirby, 1997 .
Despite determined state attempts to develop the economy, however, Ireland's performance up to the late 1980s was seen as being 'the least impressive in western Europe, perhaps in all Europe, in the twentieth century' (Lee, 1989: 521) . Kennedy et al. compare Ireland's gross national product (GNP) to the GNP of 28 other countries, mostly European, at two dates, 1913 and 1985 . At the earlier date, Ireland's per capita income ranked fourteenth and was higher than those of Norway, Finland and Italy and only a little behind that of France. Sixty years later, however, Ireland had fallen to twenty second place and had been overtaken by all western European countries (except Greece and Portugal), Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union (Kennedy et al., 1988: 14) . Ireland's decline was also recognised in the international development literature. In his study of Europe's development, Dieter Senghaas concluded that 'the history of Irish development is a prime example of emerging peripheralization' (Senghaas, 1985: 129) while J. Bradford de Long, referring to post-World War II prosperity, grouped Ireland with Spain, Portugal, Argentina and Chile 'that one would in 1870 have thought capable of equally sharing this prosperity and have not done so' (De Long, 1988 :1148 . Indeed, in 1950, Ireland's per capita GDP was still lower than that of a number of countries in the developing world. At US$3,518, it was lower than that of Venezuela ($7,424) , of Argentina ($4,987) and of Chile ($3,827) (see Maddison, 1995: Table  1-3) .
However, a unique feature of the Irish case that distinguishes it from the rest of the so-called Third World is its unique demographic profile and the effect of this on living standards. Following the Great Famine (1845-48), a sustained tradition of emigration had resulted in a continuing decline in the country's population. The area that today constitutes the Republic of Ireland had a population of 6.5 million in 1841 whereas by 1961 that population had declined to 2.8 million. It was for this reason that Raymond Crotty argued that Ireland could be categorised as an 'undeveloping country'. As he put it writing in the early 1990s just before the Celtic Tiger period began: 'The Irish economy today supports far fewer people than it has in the past. For the last 170 years, since the era of mercantile capitalism, virtually every second person born there has failed to secure a livelihood in Ireland. Since 1848, net emigration from the country has stood at about 40 per cent of the birthrate ' (2001: 2) . Since then periods of prosperity saw modest population increases while periods of recession resulted in net population losses. The latter happened in the 1980s, for example, when a deep recession led to a net outflow of people and the population fell from 3.54 million in 1986 to 3.52 million in 1991. This outflow of people, a characteristic of a regional rather than a national economy, had the effect of sustaining living standards in Ireland at a level above what would otherwise have been possible. As Kevin O'Rourke has put it, emigration has been 'one of the key driving forces in the Irish economy' allowing rising living standards go hand in hand with deindustrialisation (O'Rourke, 1995: 420) . Without this, Ireland would have been a densely populated country and living standards would have been far lower throughout the twentieth century. The declining population has also allowed Ireland achieve higher per capita growth than have other countries with comparable growth rates. Comparing Ireland to some Latin American NICs with similar average growth rates to Ireland's illustrates this point. Whereas, between 1965 and Ireland's average annual GNP growth rate was 3.8 per cent, it managed a 3 per cent average per capita GNP growth over this period. By comparison, Brazil with 4.3 per cent growth managed a 2.2 per cent per capita growth, Costa Rica with 4 per cent growth managed 1.2 per cent per capital growth, Mexico with 3.9 per cent growth managed 1.5 per cent per capita growth and Chile with 3.6 per cent growth managed 1.9 per cent per capita growth (World Development Indicators, 2002) . Similarly, Ireland's annual average per capita GDP growth over the decade of the 1990s was 7.9 per cent, over three times the rate of most of its EU partners and making it comparable to the exceptional performance of Chile (at 7.2 per cent per capita annual average growth) and Singapore (with an average of 8 per cent per capita growth annually). In interpreting these figures, it is important to remember that in Ireland's case Gross National Product (GNP) is regarded as a better measure of output growth than is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) due to the fact that foreign multinationals repatriate much of their extensive profits out of the domestic economy. 2 Using GNP reduces Ireland's growth to around 8 per cent in 1995 and 1999, 9.4 These rates were well above those of the EU and the OECD and were comparable to those of other strong export-oriented NICs like Mexico and South Korea. Between 1995 and 2001, the value of Irish exports grew from 35.3 billion euro to 92.5 billion euro while the trade balance grew from 9.2 billion to 35.2 billion euro over the same period. By the end of the decade, the largest increases in exports were accounted for by organic chemicals, computer equipment and electrical machinery, all sectors dominated by US multinationals. Between 1996 and 2000, the percentage of Irish exports going to the US market increased from 9.4 to 17.1, so that by the latter date it constituted Ireland's second most important export market. This indicates Ireland's growing dependence on the US, both as a source of foreign investment and as an export market, described by the Economist Intelligence Unit as Ireland's 'deepening integration into the US economy' (EIU, 2000: 28) .
With virtually continuous growth in unemployment during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s, a period when fears of 'jobless growth' were widely aired, one of the most remarkable aspects of Ireland's turnaround in the late 1990s is the surge in employment. As recently as 1997, 10.3 per cent of the labour force was unemployed but by late 2000 this had fallen to under 4 per cent. This is all the more remarkable as the labour force itself grew at an annual average rate of 4.3 per cent between 1997 and 2000, compared to annual average growth of 2.2 per cent between 1990 and 1997. As a result, Ireland's labour force had grown to an historic high of 1.83 million in 2002. Ireland's employment growth of 10.2 per cent in 1998 and 6.3 per cent in 1999 compared to rates of 1.6 and 1.7 per cent for the European Union, 1 per cent and 1.1 per cent for the OECD and 1.5 per cent for the United States over the same years. Not surprisingly, this impressive record of export-led and job-rich growth in the late 1990s resulted in a very significant increase in living standards, the largest increase among the OECD countries and NICs (see Kirby, 2002a: Table 2 .5, p 33). While these figures tell us nothing about how this income is distributed, they do show that Ireland in the 1990s has bridged the gap in average per capita income with its richer neighbours. Helping explain the improvement in living standards was the growth in the productivity of the Irish labour force which, averaging 3.9 per cent per annum between 1996 and 2000, was the highest among the EU countries, the US and Japan over that period (National Competitiveness Council, 2001: 36) .
In accounting for this success, there is broad agreement that such factors as stable macroeconomic management of the economy following the fiscal adjustment of 1987, an active industrial policy attracting particularly US foreign investment, EU structural funds, investment in education, and social partnership agreements (involving three-year-long agreements between employers, unions, farmers' organisations and the community sector trading income tax reductions for moderate wage increases and agreeing the main outlines of economic and social policy) all played a crucial role, though analysts disagree on the relative contributions of these elements. However, attention has also been drawn to the role of conjunctural factors, among them the fact that Ireland was uniquely placed to take advantage of the long US boom of the 1990s due to its role as a gateway to the EU market, the interest of the Clinton presidency in Ireland over the 1990s, the policy of Mary Robinson (President of Ireland from 1990-97) in fostering an identification with Ireland among the 70-million-strong Irish diaspora and, finally, competitive advantages offered by the decline in the value of the euro for Irish exports to the dollar and sterling areas (Kirby, 2002a : 45-46) .
Placing this recent success in the context of Ireland's longer-term development trajectory, therefore, raises important questions about the nature of this success, its sustainability and the lessons it holds for other countries seeking developmental success amid the vulnerabilities of globalisation. It also erases any doubts about the appropriateness of using the insights and analytical tools of development theory to examine the Irish case. Indeed, what is surprising is the neglect of Ireland by development scholars.
Interpreting Ireland's Development
The purpose of this section is to outline what have been the principal theoretical approaches used for interpreting Ireland's development trajectory. This is done in order to identify the limitations of these approaches adequately to capture certain features of the Irish case. While the focus is on analyses of the Celtic Tiger phase of Ireland's development, reference is also made in places to studies predating this period where they are considered to provide essential background or raise important questions. In particular, the work of Raymond Crotty is referred to, as his unique and challenging analysis of Irish 'undevelopment' leaves questions that need to be considered in the light of Ireland's recent economic success. In the absence of approaches derived from development theory, Ireland's development has been largely interpreted through the lens of neo-classical economics and modernisation theory. These have been challenged by approaches that can loosely be grouped under the heading of 'political economy' and by more radical approaches informed by dependency theory and by Marxism. The original work of Raymond Crotty is treated as part of this final group.
a)
Mainstream: Neo-classical economics has been the dominant, indeed the almost exclusive, economic frame of reference in the literature on Ireland's development. The abstract atemporal approach of this form of economics has meant that little attention was paid to examining the nature and causes of Ireland's development problems. As Kennedy wrote, 'the many economists who profess faith in the application of this paradigm have not sought to confront it with Ireland's long-term development experience' while economists who have sought to examine Irish development have not drawn on neo-classical economics to do so. 'Presumably none of them was convinced that this framework was adequate,' concluded Kennedy (1992: 19) . Yet the explanations for the emergence of the Celtic Tiger which have had most influence on public attitudes are those done within the theoretical frame of neo-classical economics or variations of it such as new growth theory. For these economists, Ireland's high economic and employment growth in the 1990s derives from its ability to achieve high levels of productivity and maintain cost competitiveness with its trading partners. While there are disagreements about the relative contributions to these outcomes of different elements such as exchange rate policy, social partnership or industrial policy, the essential features of this explanatory paradigm were summed up by Krugman in a paper on Ireland's economic success: 'Given the combination of good productivity growth and wage restraint, the success of the economy is in a macro sense not hard to explain ' (1997: 42) . For Sweeney, these elements lead him to assert 'a rosy future for Ireland for the next five to ten years' in which 'most of the potential problems can be dealt with by the Irish themselves ' (1999: 226) . Barry and Crafts are also optimistic, arguing that there appears to be something more than just delayed catch-up in Ireland's economic transformation. This is suggested by the evidence that Irish manufacturing sector productivity appears to have surpassed that of the UK and that, compared to East Asia, Irish total factor productivity growth is far more impressive (1999: 42-3). They conclude: 'If Ireland can maintain its "capture" of high-productivity foreign direct investment into the future, this will bode well for a continuation of the country's strong economic performance' (ibid.: 44).
Bradley has pioneered the application of new growth theory to the Irish case, arguing that neo-classical economics has problems in explaining the determinants of economic growth (Bradley et al., 1993) . Drawing on work by Paul Romer and Robert Lucas, endogenous growth theory has allowed economists to focus on how growth can be generated postulating four mechanisms -human capital, public capital or infrastructure, industrial policy, and technology and trade. Bradley's account therefore concentrates on such factors as the state's success in attracting in 'sufficient firms in the computer, instrument engineering, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors to merit a description of sector "agglomerations" or "clusters" ' (2000: 13) and the role of EU regional policy and related structural funds in improving physical infrastructure, education and training. In identifying the danger that a dominant foreign industrial sector might destabilise competitiveness in the traditional indigenous sector because of the wage pressures it generated, he argues that 'wage-setting policy and social partnership is a crucial component' in helping avoid this danger (ibid.: 24). Thus new growth theorists emphasise the room for manoeuvre open to countries to stimulate competitiveness and growth internally by investments in knowledge and in people. In reference to Ireland, Bradley highlights that 'individual small nations and regions have less power to influence their destinies than in previous periods of industrialisation, other than by refocusing their economic policies on location factors, especially those which are relatively immobile between regions: the quality of labour, infrastructure and economic governance, and the efficient functioning of labour markets ' (ibid.: 13-4) . This approach has proved influential in Irish policy making and provides much of the framework for the OECD's explanation of the origins of Ireland's economic boom (OECD, 1999: 25-62) .
Modernisation theory is the other dominant frame of reference in interpreting Ireland's development. As O'Dowd has written, 'the strength of the modernisation theory may be gauged from the extent to which its assumptions are taken for granted as common sense by its adherents who frequently fail to realise or acknowledge that they are subscribing to a particular theory of social change ' (1995: 168) . Therefore interpretations of Ireland's development which see it as moving from a traditional, rural society dominated by the Catholic Church to a modern, urban, industrial, liberal and secular society, helped in its emergence by the benign impact of foreign investment, dominate much public discourse on the nature of social change in Ireland since the 1960s (Tovey and Share, 2000: 50, 75) . For example, these assumptions dominate the work of the influential journalist, political commentator and cultural critic, Fintan O'Toole (Ó Séaghdha, 2002) . Within this framework, the Celtic Tiger is seen as the culmination of this move to modernity, 'the re-invention of Ireland', a contemporary equivalent to the transformation of Ireland wrought by the cultural and political movements of the 1890s onwards which led to the emergence of an independent Irish state in 1922 (O'Donnell, 2000: 211) . Unfortunately, however, in their single-minded pursuit of modernity, those using this interpretative framework tended to minimise or overlook entirely some disquieting aspects of this modernity in the Irish case, such as its entrenched problems of poverty and exclusion, illustrated not least in the experience of emigration, or in the boom-bust cycles that have been recurrent features of Ireland's development trajectory up to the Celtic Tiger.
These dominant approaches therefore assume outcomes about rising living standards and growing social mobility and equality. The failure to achieve these outcomes, indeed the strong evidence that development is having a polarising impact on Irish society, has not resulted in any interrogation by their adherents of their theoretical frameworks. Thus, within this dominant literature, a disjuncture between expectations and outcomes is evident again, what one major sociological textbook called 'the lack of fit between economy, state and society on the island' (Clancy et al., 1995: 18) .
b)
Political economy: In response to these problems, a second literature emerged which is characterised by its empirical examination of features of Ireland's development over any adherence to a dominant theoretical framework of interpretation. A variety of studies on Irish development can be grouped under the heading of political economy, including work on Irish industrial policy (O'Malley, 1998 (O'Malley, , 1992 (O'Malley, , 1989 , on the state (Girvin, 1989 , Breen et al., 1990 , on economic potential and performance (Kennedy et al., 1988) , on unemployment (Kennedy, 1993) and on systems of national innovation (Mjøset, 1992) . The term 'political economy' is used to describe these works since they examine the interaction of political power and economic outcomes and devote central attention to the links between state and market (Hettne, 1995a: 1-6; Jones, 1988: 1-26) . All of these, however, pre-date the emergence of the Celtic Tiger; of more interest for the purposes of this paper are the works of two scholars whose institutional interpretations of the Celtic Tiger have exercised considerable influence over policy-makers. Ó Riain's work (2000) offers the richest contribution to the literature on the nature of the Celtic Tiger. Drawing on the international literature on the developmental state, he identifies Ireland as a flexible developmental state (FDS) to be distinguished from the bureaucratic developmental states of East Asia (BDS), as the state's strategy is to connect the local to the global economy, permitting development to take place (2000: 165) . These connections he characterises as the 'global to local' (attracting in multinationals) and the 'local to global' (helping foster indigenous firms and linking them to global networks). Ó Riain describes how the Irish state has followed both of these strategies with a significant amount of success. Turning to indigenous industry, he emphasises its impressive performance with the software industry being clearly located at its post-Fordist leading edge. This, he says, can be obscured by the spectacular growth in the output of TNCs. Perhaps the most interesting part of his account is his description of how Irish development agencies learned to upgrade the capabilities of firms, playing a significant role in fostering the social networks that underpinned innovation. As part of this, he emphasises the experimental nature of programmes and the role played in organisational innovation by the performance requirements placed on the agencies, centres and programmes. Central to allowing this to happen were EU structural funds since they facilitated the emergence of a new development regime focused on indigenous industry alongside the old one focused on attracting foreign industry.
O'Donnell has traced what he calls the 're-invention of Ireland ' (1999: 32) , writing that 'European integration and governance have been centrally important in the economic transformation of the past decade' particularly through 'the alignment of state strategy with the action of economic and social interests ' (2000: 162) . From the traumatic experience of the 1980s emerged 'a new perspective on Ireland's position in European integration and a globalising economy' which resulted in the successes of the Celtic Tiger. Though the elements he lists are familiar (social partnership, EU structural funds, completing the EU internal market, European monetary union, foreign investment), his account highlights their interaction in a novel way. He identifies social partnership as 'the major innovation' which led to more than a decade of 'negotiated economic and social governance' (ibid.: 177). While European influences on the emergence of social partnership can be identified (such as the need to adhere to the disciplines of the European Monetary System, and the lessons learnt by Irish business and trade union leaders from the consensus-based approaches to economic governance in European countries), he emphasises the innovative features of the Irish practice and warns against expecting the emergence of a single European model. In particular, he sees the combination of social partnership with the European internal market programme as being particularly benign as the latter 'produced a steady pressure to make public utilities and services more efficient, consumer-oriented and independent of overt or covert state subsidy or protection' (ibid.: 183). As a result, 'Ireland's approach to market regulation, and the relationship between market, state and society, has been significantly reshaped by membership of the EU' and he instances the list of regulatory agencies established. This reconfiguration of market regulation is 'a major change in Irish public administration and policy' (ibid.: 184). EU structural funds he credits with acting as 'a stimulus to policy innovation and experimentation' (ibid.: 187) by re-introducing developmental thinking and procedures to the Irish public service, by creating a culture of monitoring and evaluation, and by helping to decentralise policy-making.
While this has the advantage of studying empirically the nature of policy and its outcomes, its focus on institutional innovation runs the risk of confusing success in some fields with overall developmental success. This is particularly true in the case of O'Donnell's work which neglects any theoretical frame of reference to guide his empirical observations with the result that his claims for transformation lack any grounding in social theory. While Ó Riain uses the work of Evans as a theoretical framework, he fails to link this with other work on the Irish state, offering no account of how a state that was up to the 1990s seen by theorists as a developmental failure could be suddenly transformed in a 'flexible developmental state'. Clearly Ó Riain's work draws our attention to some important changes in the way the Irish state has managed to foster some innovative industrial capacities but there is the danger both that he overinterprets the extent of that success and that he presumes that success in one sphere (the industrial) equates also to success in others (the social). On both these claims, there is much evidence that make his conclusions problematic (see below).
c) Radical:
Like the mainstream approaches, radical approaches are characterised by a firmer grounding in theoretical frameworks than are most of the political economy approaches. However, unlike mainstream approaches, they use theoretical frameworks that seek more adequately to capture and explain the inequitable social outcomes of Ireland's development. Because they seek to probe more critically the nature of Ireland's development, they are grouped here under the title 'Radical'. Scholars using dependency theory and Marxism have made valuable contributions to the literature on Ireland's development and, most particularly, on the Celtic Tiger. Raymond Crotty's work, which develops an original analysis of world development and therefore offers a distinctive contribution by an Irish scholar to development theory, pre-dates the Celtic Tiger but its analysis needs to be examined in the light of the success of the 1990s.
O'Hearn has most systematically applied a dependency analysis to the case of Ireland and, specifically, to the Celtic Tiger. He identifies three characteristics of Ireland's 'dependent, export-oriented development', as he calls it, -radical free trade, radical free enterprise and foreign industrial domination. These mean that the Irish market is penetrated by imports and that the state has restricted its role to marketing Ireland as a profitable location for foreign business. The result was the shutting down of much indigenous industry since it could not withstand the competitive pressures of free trade. He argues that Ireland's high rates of growth and of total factor productivity may be in part illusory, an artifact of corporate accounting since profits not made in Ireland by multinational companies are declared there due to the low regime of corporate taxation that acts as one of Ireland's principal means to attract foreign investment (O'Hearn, 1989) . While this model has gone through periods of boom and bust since the 1960s, in the 1990s it entered into an extended period of boom as it succeeded into capturing a crucial segment of foreign investments, particularly in the computer industry. He places particular importance on the Industrial Development Agency's success in attracting Intel which, in 1991, located its European site for the production of computer chips near Dublin. In this way, Ireland 'bought economic tigerhood' (2000: 74) as nearly every major player in information technology followed Intel to Ireland. In comparing the Irish tiger to the East Asian ones, O'Hearn shows that, unlike Ireland, Taiwan and South Korea developed through creating strong indigenous sectors and avoiding dependence on foreign investment. He sees Ireland as being closer to Singapore but, through its control of labour, its direct involvement in industry and its system of forced private savings, the state there intervenes more actively in its economy than does the Irish state, thus sharing the benefits of development more widely (1998: 1-32). He also highlights the contrast between the high investment rates in East Asia 3 whereas 'perhaps the greatest anomaly of the Celtic Tiger has been rapid growth without investment', he writes (2000: 77) with Irish investment rates of less than 15 per cent being the lowest in Europe in the mid 1990s. O'Hearn links rising social inequality to the nature of the Irish growth model identifying three causal factors -firstly the fact that profits and high professional incomes are the basis of Irish economic growth; secondly, the concentration of employment creation in low-paying service jobs; and, thirdly, the commitment of the state to fiscal policies that heavily favour the rich (O'Hearn, 1998) . Through the neo-corporatist wage agreements since 1987, the state holds down wages growth for the sake of international competitiveness while profits increase; this results in further accentuating inequality (2000: 78).
Allen (2000) offers a more conventional Marxist analysis of the Celtic Tiger which also emphasises how it has enriched a small elite while leaving the majority relatively less well off. Rejecting a Weberian model of social stratification because it takes little cognisance of class conflict, he contends that the Marxist concepts of late capitalism and class polarisation present a useful framework within which to analyse growing inequality amid economic growth. Defining social class above all by its relationship to the means of production allows him to conclude that the working class includes many sectors of white collar workers whose employment is characterised by the absence of control and autonomy over conditions of work, and he identifies a process of class polarisation as resources are redistributed away from the working population to the owners of capital. He details how the share of national income going to wages, pensions and social security has declined by 10 per cent while the share going to unearned income in the form of profits, interest, dividends and rent has risen by 10 per cent, a transfer he describes as 'unprecedented' (2000: 59) . He therefore concludes that the Celtic Tiger has produced a 'discontented majority' leading to a 'sharpening of conflicts' which 'make the emergence of new political forces virtually inevitable' (2000: 6).
Crotty's work is distinguished from radical theories influenced by Marxism since it seeks the cause of what he calls 'undevelopment' in the imposition of European 'individualist capitalism' on other societies throughout the world, starting with Ireland. Furthermore, for Crotty, capitalism emerged around 2,700 BC in the forests of central western Europe with the accumulation of capital in the form of crops, shelter, winter fodder and cattle which allowed a dynamic of individual property and capitalist development to accelerate 'bringing economic, technological, political, and intellectual change at an ever more rapid rate' (Crotty, 2001: 81) . The inherent dynamism of this system eventually led to its expansion beyond Europe beginning with the conquests of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Europeans, Crotty argues, encountered three types of situation in the non-European worldhunter-gatherer societies where they imposed settler colonies; East Asian crop growing societies where they encountered resistance to conquest; and other food producing societies which they conquered and exploited for metropolitan profit through imposing on them the institutions of individualist capitalism, especially private property (which gave the conquerors title to scarce resources) and capital which allowed them extract profit from those resources. This system, which lifted the masses in Europe while it condemned those in the colonies to misery, also destroyed the means whereby population had been kept in balance with the means to support it; the introduction of Western mortality-reducing knowledge and intensive agriculture allowed the growth of population outstrip that of capital and technology resulting in growing poverty. Thus, a set of institutions and technologies developed in Europe were imposed on other peoples for whose condition they were not suitable, concludes Crotty.
As a result, and despite the fact that most of these peoples have now won political independence, all the 140 or so countries on which this system was imposed undevelop as property, capital and technology continue to be used to enrich an elite rather than to develop the productive capacity of society for the benefit of the population as a whole. In this situation, the state becomes the enemy of the nation since it perpetuates these conditions. Against this, Crotty contrasts the fate of those countries on which this system was not imposed -the former settler colonies of North America, Australia and New Zealand; and the countries of East Asia and China which resisted it. These countries show the ability to adapt selectively and use for their development the technology and capital resources of individualist capitalism. He outlines at length how Ireland, despite appearances, is a good example of capitalist undevelopment as possession of land and of capital have been kept cheap while labour has been made expensive so that profit is made from the former rather than by employing the latter; this results in about half the labour force having to emigrate in order to earn a living. However, due to this export of people Ireland has, unlike any other capitalist colonial undeveloper, been able to increase the living standards of those who remained in the country and it now provides the conditions for showing how undevelopment can be undone. For Crotty, capitalist colonial undevelopment can only be transformed into development by recognising that the prices of land, labour and capital are distorted due to the consequences of conquest and by depriving the state of its role in maintaining this situation. Practically in the Irish case, he advocates distributing the nation's economic resources in equal measure to citizens through a national dividend and instituting taxes on land and on financial deposits. Raising the cost of land and capital would act as an incentive to their more productive use while, as a result of the national dividend, labour would become cheaper and therefore more likely to be employed by owners of land and capital (Crotty, 2001: 253-270) . 4 What unites all of these analyses is their view of Ireland as a relative failure in terms of development. The analyses of O'Hearn and Allen show how the Celtic Tiger has benefited an elite and resulted in growing socio-economic inequality. This is consistent with Crotty's account of Ireland's 'undevelopment' though his theoretical framework is distinctive and his prescriptions as to what should be done are much closer to a neo-classical emphasis on factor prices rather than to the structuralist accounts of O'Hearn and Allen. Furthermore, Crotty's definition of 'undevelopment' in the Irish case rests on the virtually unbroken decline since 1841 in the number of people at work in the territory that is now the Republic of Ireland. He sees only two 'blips' in this record when employment grew briefly in the 1930s and for a slightly longer period in the 1970s. However, his data stop at 1991 and most of the period since has seen a continuous expansion of jobs and the reversal of emigration. While this evidence seems to undermine the basis of Crotty's argument, his wider theoretical framework raises questions of major importance as to whether the 1990s have been just another 'blip' in Crotty's terms, or mark a more permanent transformation that would indicate Crotty's analysis was fundamentally faulty.
d)
Developmental success? From this survey of the social science literature on the Celtic Tiger, it can be seen that none of those who see it as a developmental success refer to development theory to examine what such a claim entails. 5 Many of the mainstream economic accounts seem to equate high rates of economic growth with developmental success. None examines the distributional impact of such growth, while some argue that lower public expenditure and taxation are conditions for Ireland's continuing economic success (see Sachs, 1997: 62; Barry and Crafts, 1999: 47) . Such claims raise questions about how economic growth is to translate into social success but these go unrecognised and unaddressed in the mainstream accounts. The political economy accounts focus on institutional innovation and equate these with developmental success. It is surprising that Ó Riain, in characterising the Irish state as developmental, nowhere discusses what this might mean and seems to see no contradiction between his claims of developmental success and his acknowledgement of 'the darker sides' of this success, namely growing social inequalities (2000: 181, 187) . Among the radical theorists, Allen explicitly dismisses development theory as offering useful insights for the Irish case due to its emphasis on the need for entrepreneurial values (in modernisation theory) or its espousal of economic independence (in dependency theory). He criticises development theory as it 'shifted the focus off the class divisions within Ireland and implied that Irish capital and Irish workers had a common interest in development ' (2000: 21) . However, his resort to a traditional Marxist class analysis offers few insights into the particular configuration of the Irish economy and, apart from recommending a deepening of class struggle, few useful approaches to overcoming its defects. By contrast, O'Hearn's use of dependency theory does help uncover the mechanisms that explain the workings of the Irish economy and, in particular, the links between these and inequitable social outcomes. His work, therefore, shows the potential of development theory to analyse in a fuller and more adequate way the nature of the Irish case. As already stated, Crotty's framework also shows the potential of development theory to pose important questions of continuing relevance. The deficiencies of both O'Hearn's and Crotty's frameworks, however, are that they offer overdeterministic accounts of the structural limitations of the Irish case while failing to engage in a more nuanced way with the ways in which agency is exercised, either through social actors or through the particular institutional configurations that have emerged (an example relating to the period of the Celtic Tiger is social partnership though obviously Crotty could not have been expected to analyse this; however, his treatment of the state is highly deterministic and, indeed, dismissive).
6
Insights from Development Theory This section turns to development theory to find more sophisticated tools that might help us analyse in a fuller way the nature of the Irish 'miracle'. It therefore responds to Hettne's challenge as to whether development theory 'can throw new light on development in Europe ' (1995b: 261) . Development theory is being drawn on here, not by identifying a particular approach within that theoretical field that might be usefully applied to the case of Ireland (as O'Hearn did with dependency theory) but rather by returning to some core insights that characterise it. Three such core insights 7 will serve as a guide to examine the Irish case: a. the insight that sustainable development results from the fostering of an endogenous growth dynamic; b. the insight that a key criterion for any successful development is that it results in greater social equality; c. the insight that the state plays a crucial role in fostering, and sustaining, successful development. Finally, development theory provides us with a useful criterion by which to evaluate development success or failure. This can be formulated in different ways (for example, the UNDP's concept of human development is a useful one), but here the formulation of Amaryta Sen is used as it can be said to summarise succinctly and ambitiously the ultimate objective of all development, namely that it allows people 'to live the kind of lives that people have reason to value' (Sen, 1999: 295) .
These core insights drawn from development theory offer a more critical reading of the Celtic Tiger as they highlight its high levels of dependence and vulnerability, its inequitable social impact and the way in which the Irish state has been resituated to serve the needs of global capital. Each is briefly treated in turn.
a)
Dependence: Without espousing the particular claims of dependency theory, a core insight of development theory is that successful development fosters an endogenous development dynamic. One formulation of this is in terms of a national system of innovation, the weakness of which has been identified in the past as a feature of Ireland's relative failure in development terms (Mjøset, 1992) . If a benign reading of the Celtic Tiger emphasises such features as improvements in productivity and the transformation of the productive base of the industrial economy, it also needs to attend to the growing dependence on foreign investment, particularly from the United States, as the source of its growth dynamic. According to Murphy, five main areas of high-tech foreign-owned industry (soft drinks concentrates, chemicals, medical and pharmaceutical products, computers and computer software) contributed 53 per cent of net output and 13 per cent of manufacturing employment in 1995 (Murphy, 1998: 14) . In 1998, Ireland's top three exporters were all multinational companies (Intel, Dell and Microsoft), accounting for 22 per cent of Ireland's manufactured goods exports and 18 per cent of the country's total exports (Forfás, 2002) . As Gallagher et al. conclude: 'The recent success of the Irish economy has not been built on the strength of its national system of innovation and improvement. Rather, the remarkable turnaround in its fortunes has been driven to a large extent by foreign-owned firms in the electronics (including computers), pharmaceutical and financial services industries ' (2002: 77) . Looking at changes in indigenous industry over the period of the Celtic Tiger, O'Sullivan has concluded that 'indigenous success is concentrated in a small number of firms and sectors and certainly cannot be found across all, or even most, indigenous firms. Moreover, as the example of the indigenous software industry reveals, favourable developments are as yet of too recent a vintage to interpret them as firm grounds for forecasting continued success ' (2000: 283) . The structural nature of the productive economy in Ireland, therefore, and its extreme dependence on foreign investment for its most dynamic sectors echoes Crotty's point that Ireland's remarkable export performance 'has little to do with economic efficiency' being based rather on state tax breaks and other inducements (Crotty, 2001: 240) . The fear that, without these Ireland would cease to be able to attract such industrial investment, motivates the state's strong resistance to tax harmonisation within the European Union.
As a result, the Irish 'miracle' is very dependent on winning continuing high levels of foreign, particularly US, investment. Following the decline in its economy, US foreign investment to Ireland fell from $24 billion in 2000 to $10 billion in 2001 $10 billion in (UNCTAD, 2002 . More ominously, however, evidence was emerging in 2002 that eastern European countries, soon to join the European Union, are successfully competing against Ireland for inward US investment. While new investment projects into Ireland declined by almost 28 per cent in the first six months of 2002 compared to the same period the previous year, those into eastern and central Europe increased by 54 per cent, most of these from the United States (Ernst & Young, 2002) . This illustrates the longer-term vulnerabilities of the very foundations of Ireland's economic success and casts questions marks over its sustainability. It also vindicates a key insight of Crotty that 'Irish society continues to exist at the whim of external market forces, as it did throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ' (2001: 206) .
b)
Inequality: An early definition of development by Dudley Seers emphasised the centrality of a decline in poverty, unemployment and inequality to any successful development. 'If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development", even if per capita income had soared', wrote Seers (1969: 7) . For Crotty also, growing poverty and inequality is what defines 'undevelopment': those countries 'with more people worse off than formerly, or fewer better off than before' (Crotty, 2001: 255) . This draws attention to one of the central failures of the Celtic Tiger, namely the growth in Ireland's already high levels of socio-economic inequality relative to its neighbours. This can be illustrated both by the evidence of trends in relative poverty and by trends in income distribution. Data from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) show that the percentage of both households and persons with disposable incomes falling below 40 per cent and 50 per cent of average income has grown substantially between 1994 and 2000 . 8 The data also reveal a consistent growth in the depth of poverty below each income line meaning that 'those falling below relative income thresholds are falling further and further behind the middle of the income distribution ' (ibid., 2002: 22) .
Consistent with this evidence, data also show a growth in inequality during the 1990s, after 20 years of remarkable stability in Irish income distribution data. The ESRI found that, between 1994 and 1998, 'there was a redistribution of over 1 per cent of total income away from the bottom 30 per cent of the income distribution -representing a substantial shift in a short period' (Nolan, Maitre, O'Neill and Sweetman, 2000: xix) . Data from the Central Statistics Office Household Budget Survey, comparing the situation in 1994-95 with that in 1999-2000, reveals that the average disposable income of households in the top two income deciles increased by over 61 per cent while that of households in the bottom two deciles increased by 37 per cent. Households in the intervening deciles recorded average increases of between 46 per cent and 55 per cent. The ratio between the average weekly disposable income of households in the highest income decile compared with those in the lowest decile rose from 11:1 in 1994-95 to 13:1 in 1999 13:1 in -2000 13:1 in (CSO, 2002 . Ó Riain describes well some of the causal dynamics of this growing inequality and its significance. He writes: 'An unintended consequence of the FDI model was … the creation of a social group which would ultimately come to be the foundation of an alternative model of development. Ultimately it was this new class, combining entrepreneurs and technical professionals in a new class compromise which would emerge as the socio-political force at the heart of the Irish boom of the 1990s' (Ó Riain and O'Connell, 2000: 324) . He acknowledges that 'their increasing profits and wages would create rising inequality even as they became firmly embedded at the heart of the Irish economy and polity ' (ibid.: 324) and that this generates 'enormous political tensions that the decentralized state institutions have great difficulty containing' (Ó Riain, 2000: 183) . For him, egalitarianism is the greatest challenge facing the Celtic Tiger (ibid.: 187). Crotty also presciently foresaw a 'reaction by the privileged' in Ireland which would lead to 'a reversal of the long-term relative increase in the lowest incomes' (Crotty, 2001: 271) . This is exactly what happened in the 1990s. As former taoiseach (prime minister, 1981-82; 1982-87) Garret FitzGerald puts it 'this process of redistribution did not resume after the recovery from the financial crisis of the early 1980s … For much of the past 15 years the purchasing power of social benefits in Ireland was deliberately held down, being allowed for much of this period to fall behind industrial earnings'. This he attributes to the fact that 'Irish politicians of that time fell under the influence of a new right-wing liberal ideology antithetical to further redistribution' (FitzGerald, 2003: xxiv, 87 ).
In conclusion, it can be said that if Crotty's definition of 'undevelopment' in the Irish case, namely the decline in the number of people at work in Ireland, ceased to hold true after the early 1990s, elements of his wider definition, namely more people worse off than before and fewer better off, remain valid since relative poverty and income inequality have grown substantially over the period of the Celtic Tiger.
c)
The competition state: The third contribution of development theory relates to the role of the state. While the literature on the developmental state was drawn on by Ó Riain to characterise the Irish state as a 'flexible developmental state', development theory also serves to raise more critical questions about just how developmental has been the Irish state's active role in fostering the Celtic Tiger (through its industrial policy and through trading tax cuts for wage moderation under social partnership). For, as outlined above, this action of the state has resulted in a highly vulnerable and dependent economy and an ever more unequal society, both of which undermine the claim of the Irish 'miracle' to be developmental; they also validate in a general way Crotty's fundamental point that Irish institutions poorly serve Irish development through policies that favour capital and asset accumulation by elites and that perpetuate inequality. However, to overcome the determinism in his quite general account of why the state acts in this way, requires a deeper probing to uncover the nature of the Irish state and the model of development it has fostered.
Rather than characterising the Irish state as developmental, a more accurate label would the 'the competition state'. As outlined by Cerny, this succeeds the 'national industrial welfare state' and has emerged under the pressure of economic globalisation which has led to the expansion of state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness and marketisation (Cerny, 2000: 122) . It marks a shift from state intervention to develop and maintain a range of basic or strategic economic activities (nationalised industries, a robust welfare state) to one of flexible response to competitive conditions in rapidly evolving international markets. In political terms, it also marks a shift away from maximising welfare to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability (ibid.: 123). Cerny identifies how states combine international competitiveness with 'the retention of a minimal welfare net to sustain sufficient consensus' as illustrating the different responses of states to the challenge of globalisation (ibid.: 126) . This describes much more accurately than does any aspiration to being developmental the role played by Ireland's social partnership arrangements.
Characterising the Irish state as a competition state helps to account for what seem like contradictory puzzles for those who use other frameworks of interpretation as it explains the correlation of economic success with social failure. For the Irish state has fostered a low-tax, low-spend model of economic growth in which the market is allocated the key role in achieving social goals. Undermining its own ability to play a role in this respect, it has allowed social spending fall well below averages throughout the rest of the European Union. 9 With its ability to attract high levels of foreign investment based upon rates of corporate taxation well below those of its EU neighbours, it is a state that has reconfigured itself so that it serves the needs of corporate capital over those of its own citizens. Furthermore, the contradiction between depending on the EU for high social transfers through structural funds while gaining competitive advantage through its low tax rates 10 has been coming under growing critical scrutiny by governments in other member states (see Kirby, 2002a , for a fuller discussion). These contradictions further undermine its long-term sustainability drawing attention to a feature of the Irish case consistently emphasised by Crotty, namely the inability of the state to fund its costly model of industrialisation. If, in the 1980s when Crotty was refining his analysis, this was evident in the high levels of indebtedness built up by the state, in the post-Celtic Tiger phase it is more evident in the tendency to cut back state expenditure on necessary infrastructural and social developments in order to avoid a resort to borrowing again.
d)
Lives Irish people have reason to value: Taking Sen's demanding formulation offers us some way of analysing the developmental impact of the major economic, social and institutional transformations accompanying the Celtic Tiger. For, as Tucker put it, 'we must consider people's values, ideas, and beliefs, their identity and feelings, how they view the world and their place in it, and what is meaningful to them' (Tucker, 1997: 4) . This requires studying the meanings attributed to the phenomenon of the Celtic Tiger, to undertake what can be called a study of its 'cultural political economy'. Significance can be attributed to evidence that in Ireland suicide is the most common cause of death among males between the ages of 15 and 24 and that the rate of suicide among men aged between 25 and 34 is the second highest in this category in the EU. There was a rise of 94 per cent in violent assaults and of 83 per cent in sexual offences between 2000 and 2001 (part of which may be due to changes in the way such data are compiled by the Irish police though other categories of crime did not rise by similar amounts). The murder rate has also risen sharply in Ireland since the early 1990s at a time when it has stabilised in Britain: 60 murders were recorded in 2001 as against 25 in 1992. Per capita alcohol consumption, traditionally low in Ireland compared to other European countries, rose by 41 per cent between 1989 and 1999, by far the highest increase in the EU. Reflecting on these trends in Irish society in the 1990s, a leading professor of psychiatry concluded that 'there are worrying trends to suggest that the civic order is in disarray' (Casey, 2002) . The cultural political economy of the Celtic Tiger can also be examined through examples of critical media discourse (for a further elaboration of the concept of a 'cultural political economy', see Kirby, 2002b: 22) . Based on this evidence, Kirby identifies some meanings attributed to it: 'Values such as individualism, materialism, intolerance of dissent, lack of concern for the environment and a failure to value caring are identified as characterising life under the Celtic Tiger ' (2002: 159) . As Flynn put it in writing about the mood of a group of Irish holidaymakers returning home from Spain: 'This wasn't just the customary gripes at the end of a holiday; there was the clear sense that people were no longer proud of where they lived and where they worked and where they were raising their children' (Flynn, 2002) . This evidence raises questions about whether the Celtic Tiger has helped or hindered Irish people living the kind of lives they have reason to value.
Conclusions
Examining the Irish 'miracle' through the lens of development theory has drawn attention to the significance of elements that are either neglected by other accounts or insufficiently interrelated in such accounts. It further casts doubt on claims that this period of economic boom was developmental and that Ireland offers a model of development success under the conditions of real existing globalisation. Instead, it can be fairly concluded that Ireland's 'miracle' resulted from prioritising economic growth over social development, that the benefits were reaped mostly by a small economic elite and that the quality of life in Irish society has been severely undermined in some crucial aspects. To this extent it can be seen as an example of the social costs of economic success in this globalised world. The failure of the Celtic Tiger to foster an endogenous dynamic of innovation, the growing social polarisation that has accompanied it and the reconfiguration of the Irish state in a decisive manner so that it attends to the needs of corporate capital over those of its own citizens have all served to camouflage rather than resolve Ireland's long-standing development problems. Applying core insights of Ireland's leading development theorist, Raymond Crotty, to the Celtic Tiger shows how, in substance, many of these core insights remain valid even if some of the details of how Ireland's development problems manifest themselves require revision.
